The Social Stratification of Social Risks: Class and Responsibility in the 'New' Welfare State by Olivier Pintelon et al.
UCD  Geary  Institute  Discussion  Papers  often  represent  preliminary  work  and  are  circulated  to 
encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised 
version may be available directly from the author. 
 
Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of UCD Geary Institute. Research 








UCD GEARY INSTITUTE 
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
 
The Social Stratification of Social Risks: 




Herman Deleeck Centre for Social Policy 
University of Antwerp 
 
Bea Cantillon 
Herman Deleeck Centre for Social Policy 
University of Antwerp 
 
Karel Van den Bosch 
Herman Deleeck Centre for Social Policy 
University of Antwerp 
 
Christopher T. Whelan 
School of Sociology & Geary Institute 








The Social Stratification of Social Risks: Class 
and Responsibility in the ‘New’ Welfare State 
 
Olivier Pintelon* 
Herman Deleeck Centre for Social Policy (University of Antwerp) 
Sint-Jacobstraat 2 
B-2000 Antwerp, Belgium 
Email: olivier.pintelon@ua.ac.be , tel.: +32 (0)3 265 53 78 
 
  Bea Cantillon   
Herman Deleeck Centre for Social Policy (University of Antwerp) 
Sint-Jacobstraat 2 
B-2000 Antwerp, Belgium 
Email: bea.cantillon@ua.ac.be, tel.: +32 (0)3 265 53 98 
 
Karel Van den Bosch 
Herman Deleeck Centre for Social Policy (University of Antwerp) 
Sint-Jacobstraat 2 
B-2000 Antwerp, Belgium 
Email: karel.vandenbosch@ua.ac.be , tel.: +32 (0)3 265 53 83 
 
Christopher T. Whelan 
School of Sociology & Geary Institute 
University College Dublin 
Newman Building 
Belfield 
Dublin 4, Ireland 
Email: christopher.whelan@ucd.ie, tel.: + 353 (0)1 716 8561 
 
* Corresponding author  
1 
 
The Social Stratification of Social Risks: Class and Responsibility in the ‘New’ Welfare State 
ABSTRACT 
Welfare states are said to have evolved over the course of the past twenty years towards a ‘social 
investment’ model of welfare, characterised by a focus on equality of opportunity and upward social 
mobility combined with greater emphasis on individual responsibility. More or less concurrently, 
under  the  mantra  of  ‘individualisation’,  scepticism  has  grown  with  regard  to  the  relevance  of 
traditional  stratification  schemes.  This  paper  sets  out  to  ascertain  whether  social  class,  i.e. 
intergenerational background, (still) affects the occurrence of ‘social risks’. Using SILC 2005 data, it 
considers the impact of social class (of origin) on a relevant selection of social risks: unemployment, 
ill-health, living in a jobless household, single parenthood, temporary employment, and low-paid 
employment. The results provide clear evidence of a continuing influence of social class. On this 
basis, we argue that a one-sided focus on individual responsibility could open the door to new forms 
of marginalisation. 
 
Key words: social risks, social stratification, social class, social investment state, individualisation 
thesis 
 




In  consequence  of  changing  economic,  demographic  and  political  conditions,  European  welfare 
states are in transition,
1 as a new welfare set-up seems to have emerged since the mid-1990s. In 
discourse,  at  least,  a  shift  can  be  observed  from  ‘traditional  social  protection’  towards  ‘social 
investment’ (e.g. Giddens, 1998; Hudson and Kühner, 2009; Morel et al., 2009; Taylor-Gooby, 2008). 
Despite conceptual vagueness - prompting some to label social investment a ‘quasi-concept’ (e.g. 
Jenson, 2009) - two central features can be distinguished: investment in human capital and the 
objective of full labour market participation (Perkins et al., 2004).
2 Indeed, the assertion that the 
social  investment  state  aims  to  ‘rebuild  the  welfare  state  around  work’  (Department  of  Social 
Security, 1998) has become iconic.
 A variety of conceptual perspectives capture more or less the 
same  ideas.  Some  speak  of  an  ‘active’  welfare  state  (e.g.  Vandenbroucke,  2001),  while  Esping-
Andersen (2003) refers to the need for a ‘new’ welfare state, and Taylor-Gooby (2008) points to the 
emergence in Europe of a ‘new welfare state settlement’.  
The transition towards a ‘new’ or ‘active’ welfare state has, arguably, led to a changing citizenship 
regime (Jenson, 2009; Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003). In view of higher labour market participation, 
the traditional notion of social citizenship (Marshall, 1950), based as it is on (rather unconditional) 
social rights, is increasingly called into question, as the conception of social rights themselves has to 
some extent changed (Cox, 1998). In the ‘new’ welfare state, more emphasis is put on reciprocity of 
rights and duties. Hence, individual responsibility has come to play a more determining role in social 
policy  discourse.  As  governments  strive  to  invest  in  human  capital  and  equal  opportunities,  a 
corresponding  obligation  emerges  for  individuals  to  take  responsibility  for  their  own  choices. 
Consequently, welfare states are increasingly rebuilt to stimulate market participation and upward 
social mobility, e.g. by eliminating ‘unemployment traps’ or by providing comprehensive childcare.  
There is however legitimate cause for concern. In the light of a growing emphasis on individual 
responsibility, it is worthwhile (re)considering the relevance of social background, i.e. social class, to 
socio-economic outcomes. As Heron and Dwyer (1999) observe, a one-sided focus on individual 
responsibility and labour market participation opens the door to restricting the rights of traditional 
social  beneficiaries  by  the  application  of  the  rhetoric  of  modernisation  without  appropriate 
mechanisms to resist new forms of marginalisation. Therefore, developments relating to the social 
investment state need to be assessed in the context of the social stratification of socio-economic 
outcomes. More specifically, this article examines how social background, i.e. social class, structures 
the occurrence of so-called ‘social risks’, defined as socio-economic circumstances resulting in a 
significant loss of income and, consequently, an increased likelihood of poverty. This study fits into 
the ongoing debate on the relevance of social class to social exclusion in particular, as increasing 
scepticism is expressed with regard to the structuring impact of social class in the face of societal 
changes such as growing flexibility in the labour market, destabilisation of family structures, rising 
general prosperity and differentiated consumption patterns (e.g. Clark and Lipset, 1991; Lee and 
Turner, 1996; Pakulski and Waters, 1996; Scott, 1996). 
The article is structured as follows. First we elaborate on the ‘death of social class’ thesis. Our specific 
focus is on the structuring impact of social class in respect of social exclusion. Subsequently, we 
present  a  selection  of  social  risks  whose  social  stratification  pattern  we  intend  to  investigate: 
unemployment, ill-health, living in a jobless household, single parenthood, temporary employment,  
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and low-paid employment. We then proceed to formulate a number of hypotheses on the social 
stratification of social risks, drawing on the literature on the social stratification of social exclusion 
and  the  intergenerational  transmission  of  social  class.  The  following  section  sets  out  the 
methodology applied. Using SILC 2005 data, we investigate the impact of social class of origin on the 
aforementioned set of social risks. The existence of social gradients has already been demonstrated 
for some of these risks, particularly unemployment (e.g. O'Neill and Sweetman, 1998) and ill-health 
(e.g. Feinstein, 1993). The purpose of our analysis is therefore to extend the body of knowledge by 
considering a broad selection of social risks. Furthermore, we make use of high-quality cross-national 
data, so as to determine whether stratification patterns differ between countries. The main findings 
of our analysis are documented in the results section. Finally, in the concluding part, we argue that 
the evidence points to the persistent influence of social background on the distribution of social risks 
and  thus  calls  into  question  the  validity  of  the  ‘death  of  social  class’  discourse.  We  also  draw 
attention to role that an increasing emphasis on individual responsibility plays in both promoting and 
concealing restricted access to welfare spending for traditional beneficiaries. 
The debate on the ‘death of social class’ 
A series of societal changes, such as increasing flexibility in the labour market and destabilisation of 
family  structures,  has  prompted  growing  scepticism  with  regard  to  the  salience  of  traditional 
stratification schemes. In particular, questions have arisen in relation to the continued relevance of 
social class, given that contemporary societies have become more fragmented and individualised 
(Beck, 1992). The debate was triggered by Clark and Lipset (1991) and their article ‘Are Social Classes 
Dying?’. Their main argument revolved around the notion of an increasing fragmentation of classes, 
as  reflected  in  the  declining  significance  of  class  voting  and  the  growing  differentiation  of 
consumption  patterns.  Arguments  for  and  against  this  thesis  were  subsequently  explored  in  a 
substantial stream of sociological literature (e.g. Beck, 1992; Devine, 1992; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 
1992;  Hout  et  al.,  1993;  Pakulski  and  Waters,  1996).  In  various  branches  of  social  science,  the 
relevance of social class continues to be a much debated topic (e.g. Archer and Orr, 2011; Atkinson, 
2007; Beck, 2007; Bolam et al., 2004; Bottero, 2004; Surridge, 2007; Van der Waal et al., 2007). 
In  this  paper,  we  focus  on  the  social  stratification  of  ‘social  risks’,  defined  as  socio-economic 
circumstances resulting in a significant loss of income and an increased likelihood of poverty. The 
issue at hand should be placed in the context of the ongoing debate on the structuring impact of 
social  class  with  regard  to  social  exclusion.  The  traditional  view  on  the  stratification  of  risks  is 
primarily challenged by two, partly competing, perspectives.  
First and foremost, the individualisation thesis (Beck, 1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1996; Beck 
and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002) calls into question the influence of traditional stratification schemes, and 
proposes that social risks now affect a larger share of the population. Due to societal changes, such 
as the rise of post-industrial employment (e.g. Bell, 1973), the growing prevalence of flexible work 
arrangements (e.g. Littek and Charles, 1995) and the greater diversification of family structures (e.g. 
Kuijsten, 2002), traditional structures are said to have lost their grip on individuals’ lives. According to 
Beck (1992), the greater salience of such processes is conducive to the emergence of a ‘risk society’, 
where higher levels of social risks are more widely spread among segments of the population. In 
addition, social risks have purportedly become detached from their traditional class moorings. In line 
with this argument, Berger (1994) claims that a growing diversification of the routes into poverty is  
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resulting in a more heterogeneous poor population. Leisering and Leibfried (1999) concur with the 
view that poverty is increasingly a social risk not only for marginalised groups, but also for broader 
sections of society. We are thus witnessing a ‘democratisation of poverty’, as it were, whereby social 
risks appear to be transcending traditional social boundaries. 
The  life  course  perspective  also  challenges  the traditional  class  perspective.  In  broad  terms,  the 
former theory asserts that social risks are to be understood as a phase in a person’s life trajectory 
(Vandecasteele, 2007, 2010; Whelan and Maitre, 2008). This emphasis on the life cycle is connected 
with the notion of ‘new’ social risks. Generally speaking, ‘new’ social risks are seen as a consequence 
of  the  ‘post-industrial  transition’:  deindustrialisation  and  tertiarisation  of  employment,  women’s 
entry into the labour market and the increased instability of family structures (Bonoli, 2005, 2007). 
Taylor-Gooby (2004) connects new social risks with the life course on account of the fact that they 
affect individuals belonging to specific sub-groups at particular stages in their lives. Since they are 
associated primarily with entrance into the labour market and with the demands arising from care 
responsibilities at the stage of family formation, new social risks tend to affect people earlier in life. 
Similarly, the life-course concept emphasises the importance of agency in responding to biographical 
events. Here, the focus falls on so-called ‘risky life events’ or ‘life-course risks’, such as leaving the 
parental home or partnership dissolution (Vandecasteele, 2007, 2010). This life course perspective 
on social risks has often been linked with the individualisation thesis. The argument goes that new 
inequalities emerge in consequence of individualised life trajectories and lifestyles, where individual 
agency and responsibility play a crucial role, while hierarchical stratification structures such as social 
class are considered to have lost their impact.     
In a parallel stream of literature, however, sociologists have continued to emphasise the relevance of 
traditional  stratification  schemes  to  processes  of  social  exclusion.  Social  class  is  observed  to 
influence, among other aspects, the duration of poverty spells (Whelan et al., 2003) and, controlling 
for institutional determinants, the individual poverty risk (Dewilde, 2008). Some scholars have tried 
to combine the life cycle and social class perspectives on social exclusion. For instance, Whelan and 
Maître (2008) have shown that social class and life cycle stage influence the occurrence of social risks 
in an interactive rather than an additive manner. The social class and life course perspectives should 
be  viewed  as  potentially  complementary,  rather  than  as  necessarily  generating  competing 
hypotheses. In line with this argument, a recent contribution by Vandecasteele (2010) has shown 
that risky life events do not trigger identical poverty effects for different social classes. Her results 
reveal that the most vulnerable groups are disproportionately affected by the poverty-triggering 
impact of life course events. The findings emerging from this stream of literature seem to suggest 
that social class is definitely not dead, and that a decline of its relevance (to social exclusion) has yet 
to be proven.  
Selection of social risks 
In  this  section,  we  set  out  our  choice  of  social  risks.  Our  selection  of  relevant  socio-economic 
circumstances is based on the literature on social risks, particularly the so-called ‘old’ and ‘new’ or 
‘post-industrial’ risks. Originally, welfare states were designed to provide coverage against a selection 
of  well-defined  ‘old’  risks  (Bovenberg,  2007).  Both  unemployment  and  ill-health  reflect  these 
‘traditional’ social risks, as they are related to circumstances that create obstacles to participating in 
the labour market (Bonoli, 2007). We have also included living in a jobless household in our analysis,  
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as it is increasingly seen as a strong indicator of social exclusion. For this reason, it has been included 
in the EU 2020 multidimensional poverty target (European Council, 2010). 
Societal changes have led to the emergence of what may be termed ‘new’ or ‘post-industrial’ social 
risks.  Generally  speaking,  such  risks  stem  from  several  societal  developments,  such  as  the 
deindustrialisation and tertiarisation of employment, the growing instability of family structures and 
the destandardisation of employment (Bonoli, 2007). The destandardisation of family structures, for 
instance, has led to several ‘new’ social risks, the most common of which is single parenthood. This 
presents challenges to the ‘traditional’ welfare state, as it was initially designed to suit the male 
breadwinner model (Taylor-Gooby, 2008). As a result, single parents now face higher poverty risks 
(Brown and Moran, 1997; Dewilde, 2008). Often the reconciliation of work and family life is seen as 
the most important ‘new social risk’ (Bonoli, 2005, 2007; Taylor-Gooby, 2004). However, we did not 
include it in our selection, as dual-earner families are not likely to be confronted with a greater 
likelihood of poverty. Therefore, the reconciliation of work and family is not a social risk according to 
our working definition. 
The final two social risks to be included in our analysis are both induced by the destandardisation of 
labour  relations.  The  greater  emphasis  on  flexibility  is  resulting  in  more  atypical  employment 
relationships. And the rise of (often involuntary) temporary employment has created a new risk of 
socio-economic  insecurity.  Research  has  shown  that  fixed-term  contracts  are  associated  with 
negative socio-economic impacts (Giesecke, 2009). In addition, the increased deregulation of labour 
markets has exacerbated the low-pay risk, as institutional features (such as collective bargaining) 
shape the odds of becoming low paid (Blau and Kahn, 1996; Lucifora and Salverda, 2009). In sum, the 
social stratification of the following social risks is investigated: unemployment, ill-health, living in a 
jobless household, single parenthood, temporary employment (i.e. under a fixed-term contract) and 
low-paid  employment.  Each  of  these  particular  circumstances  is  likely  to  be  associated  with 
reductions in income and greater exposure to poverty. 
Research hypotheses 
A number of hypotheses can be formulated with regard to the social stratification of these social 
risks. First of all, we consider the expected impact of social class of origin. It has been demonstrated 
in several articles that social background affects some of our selected social risks.
3 More particularly, 
the existence of intergenerational background effects is extensively documented for unemployment 
(e.g.  O'Neill  and  Sweetman,  1998)  and  ill-health  (e.g.  Siahpush  and  Singh,  2008).  For  the  other 
selected social risks, the impact of social background has hitherto been less at the forefront of 
research. Especially with regard to temporary employment (i.e. fixed-term contracts) and low pay, 
the relationship with individuals’ intergenerational backgrounds remains largely uncharted territory. 
For jobless households and single parenthood, there are indirect indications of the impact of social 
class of origin. As living in a jobless household can be seen as a concentration of unemployment at 
the household level, we expect this risk to be heavily affected by social class of origin. As regards 
single parenthood, there is some indirect evidence of social background influences, too. The risk of 
early childbearing and teenage pregnancy is, for example, associated with parental characteristics 
(e.g. Mersky and Reynolds, 2006). Furthermore, social class is likely to influence the chances of 
marital disruption. Several studies have shown that divorce odds are linked to social class in most 
European countries (Gibson, 1974; Haskey, 1984; Jalovaara, 2001, 2003). In sum, we assume that  
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social class of origin affects all of our selected social risks, i.e. high-risk groups are characterised by 
weaker social backgrounds (hypothesis 1). Moreover, the effects of social class of origin may be 
assumed to be mediated by the individual’s educational attainment and social class (hypothesis 2), 
since international research has shown that the level of qualification attained is probably the major 
mediating factor in class mobility (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; Ishida et al., 1995; Marshall et al., 
1997). 
Furthermore, we must consider the possibility of cross-national variation in stratification patterns. 
We can account for cross-national differences by referring to the literature on (absolute and relative) 
mobility patterns in Western countries. Erikson and Goldthorpe’s (1992) hallmark study concluded 
that there were relatively small differences across fifteen countries in the pattern and degree of 
social  fluidity  or  relative  mobility.  They  examined  the  impact  on  social  fluidity  of  a  number  of 
‘modernisation’  indicators,  including  level  of  industrial  development,  economic  and  educational 
inequality, and political attributes. Overall, though, they found no clear relationship between social 
mobility and country-level characteristics. Moreover, the more recent comparative analyses in Breen 
(2004) and Breen and Jonsson (2005) report a trend towards convergence in class structures across 
countries and smaller variation in rates of absolute mobility. In addition, Breen and Luijkx (2004) 
recently found no relationship between the Gini coefficient and social fluidity. In general, both trends 
and cross-national differences in class mobility are difficult to connect directly with the welfare state. 
Consequently, for the purposes of our analysis, we anticipate that the structuring impact of social 
class is more or less the same across nations (hypothesis 3). However, some claim there is a distinct 
social  democratic  cluster.  Erikson  and  Goldthorpe  (2002:  36),  for  instance,  state  that  “among 
economically  advanced  economies,  Sweden  appears  as  the  most  open.”  Therefore,  we  also 
investigate a rival hypothesis, according to which the intergenerational class effects are smaller for 
the  social  democratic  welfare  states,  as  they  are  characterised  by  higher  degrees  of 
(intergenerational) social mobility (hypothesis 4).  
Methodology and descriptive results 
The analyses are performed on the EU-SILC data from 2005, making use of the intergenerational 
module. The EU-SILC (Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) is the EU reference source for 
comparative statistics on income distribution and social exclusion at the European level (Atkinson 
and Marlier, 2010). In this paper, cross-sectional data are used for the following countries: Ireland, 
the  United  Kingdom,  Denmark,  Finland,  Norway,  Austria,  Belgium,  France,  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands.  This  selection  contains  most  of  the  wealthy  EU  member  states,  as  discourse 
emphasising ‘social investment’ has been most pronounced in these countries. Furthermore, these 
European  welfare  states  span  all  three  types  distinguished  by  Esping-Andersen  (1990).  We  had 
intended also to include Sweden in our analysis, but data problems (too many missing values on the 
father’s occupation) forced us to omit it. For all countries included in the analysis, the cross-sectional 
data are based on a nationally representative probability sample of the population residing in private 
households within the country. Only persons aged 25 to 64 were invited to answer the questions in 
the intergenerational module, so our analysis is restricted to individuals in that age range. 
In the following subsections, we first address the operationalisation of social class and educational 
level.  This  is  followed  by  a  description  of  each  social  risk  and  a  mapping  of  the  selected  ‘risk 
population’. Finally, the statistical techniques employed are described.  
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Operationalisation of social class 
The derivation of social class of origin is based upon the reported occupation of the father (ISCO-88) 
when  the  respondent  was  14  years  old.  For  current  social  class,  we  rely  on  the  respondent’s 
occupation or, in the case of unemployment, former occupation. Data relating to the occupation of 
the father is only available for respondents older than 24 and younger than 65. We were unable to 
make  use  of  the  European  Socio-Economic  Classification  (Harrison  and  Rose,  2006;  Rose  and 
Harrison,  2007),  as  some  of  the  requisite  data  were  not  at  our  disposal  (e.g.  the  number  of 
employees in the firm and whether the respondent has a supervisory function). On the basis of ISCO-
88 codes, the following classification was drawn up: high-skilled non-manual occupations, low-skilled 
non-manual occupations, skilled manual occupations, elementary occupations, and not in work.
4/5 
The category ‘not in work’ is not used in case of the respondent’s own social class, as this would lead 
to  tautological  results.  Those  who  have  never  worked  are  excluded  from  the  analysis,  as  are 
members of the armed forces. Sweden is omitted due to the extremely high rate of non-response.
6 In 
the  analysis, the  social  class  categories  are  transformed  into  dummy  variables,  with elementary 
occupations as the category of reference. 
Operationalisation of educational level 
The educational level of the respondents is based on the highest attained educational degree. All 
respondents  whose  educational  attainment  does  not  exceed  lower  secondary  education  are 
categorised as ‘low skilled’. Respondents with a degree of (upper) secondary education are classified 
as  ‘medium  skilled’,  whereas  those  with  a  tertiary  degree  are  defined  as  ‘high  skilled’.  For  the 
analyses, dummy variables are used, with low skilled serving as the reference category. 
Operational definitions of the selected social risks 
Table 1 presents an overview of the operational definitions of the social risks considered, as well as 
the selected ‘risk population’ for which analyses were conducted. All social risks are constructed as 
dummy variables. Depending on the social risk, the population under analysis is redefined. In what 
follows we discuss in greater detail the operationalisation of the various risks as well as the target 
population of each analysis. 
Table 1     Operationalisation of the selected social risks 
Operationalisation social risk  Risk population
a 
Unemployment: unemployed, available for and actively 
looking for a job (ILO definition) 
the workforce (25 to 55 years old) 
Ill-health: the self-reported general health is 'bad' or 
'very bad' 
all respondents (25 to 64 years old) 
Jobless household: respondents living in a household  respondents (25 to 64 years old), living in a  
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where the work intensity is below 0.2   household with young dependent children (max. 12 
years old) 
Single parenthood: respondents without a partner and 
parenting a child in the same household 
respondents (25 to 64 years old), living in a 
household with young dependent children (max. 12 
years old) 
Temporary employment: holding a job under a fixed-
term contract 
the workforce (25 to 55 years old), excluding the self-
employed  
Low pay: annual gross earnings are below two-thirds of 
median earnings 
full-time working employees (25 to 64 years old) who 
have worked 12 months in the previous year 
Notes: 
a the population for which the analyses were conducted 
In addition to the data-imposed restriction to ages 25 to 64, the analyses for unemployment and 
temporary employment were confined to those aged under 56, due to cross-national differences in 
welfare state schemes for the group between 56 and 64 years (e.g. early retirement schemes) and 
the low number of respondents in this age bracket holding temporary jobs. Students, pensioners and 
respondents fulfilling military service were excluded from all analyses. 
We use the standard ILO definition of unemployment. An individual is considered to be unemployed 
if he/she reports not to be working, despite being willing and able to work and actively seeking a job. 
The  risk  population  is  the  workforce  (25-54  years),  encompassing  both  the  employed  and  the 
unemployed. Ill-health is measured using the self-reported health of the respondents: a respondent 
is considered as being in ill-health if his/her self-reported health status is ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’. The 
circumstance of living in a jobless household depends on the work intensity of the household, which 
is  calculated  in  accordance  with  the  Eurostat  definition:  the  number  of  months  worked  by  all 
household members divided by the ‘workable’ months during the income reference year previous to 
the survey. The workable months are the number of months for which information is available on the 
household member’s activity status. 
Single parents are respondents without a partner in the same household and parenting a young child 
(up  to  12 years).  The  risk  population  is  restricted  to  respondents who  have at  least one  young 
dependent  child.  Temporary  employment  is  defined  in  terms  of  the  respondent’s  employment 
contract: respondents indicating that they are working under a fixed-term contract are considered to 
be in temporary employment. The relevant risk population is the workforce aged 25 to 55. Self-
employed respondents are excluded. Finally, for low pay, we use the standard OECD definition: those 
whose earnings fall below two-thirds of the median gross earnings of full-year, full-time employees in 
the previous year are considered to be low paid. The analysis is restricted to full-time employees, 
because of a lack of accurate data regarding number of hours worked.  
Descriptive results  
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Table 2 presents an overview of the univariate results for these social risks. The percentages in the 
table reflect the number of people in the selected risk group who experience that particular social 
risk.  Below  each  percentage,  the  95%-confidence  interval  is  given.  The  confidence  intervals  are 
calculated using a correction for the clustering of respondents in households.  
Table 2     Risk levels in the selected welfare states (with 95%-confidence intervals) 
 









Scandinavian             
Denmark  3.42%  5.85%  3.12%  6.91%   a  8.49% 
  [2.68-4.16%]  [4.97-6.73%]  [1.84-4.40%]  [5.41-8.40%]    [7.30-9.69%] 
Finland   6.18%  7.25%  2.99%  6.09%  12.38%  11.78% 
  [5.41-6.95%]  [6.54-7.96%]  [2.21-3.77%]  [5.04-7.14%]  [11.20-13.56%]  [10.70-12.87%] 
Norway  2.90%  7.77%  2.91%  9.34%  9.68%  14.74% 
  [2.25-3.55%]  [6.91-8.62%]  [1.97-3.84%]  [7.84-10.84%]  [8.54-10.82%]  [13.33-16.16%] 
Continental             
Austria  2.37%  3.67%  2.51%  5.88%  5.25%  12.18% 
  [1.88-2.87%]  [3.14-4.20%]  [1.64-3.38%]  [4.88-6.88%]  [4.39-6.10%]  [10.85-13.50%] 
Belgium  6.85%  6.57%  8.60%  7.60%  8.27%  8.69% 
  [6.04-7.67%]  [5.91-7.24%]  [6.97-10.24%]  [6.39-8.81%]  [7.28-9.26%]  [7.56-9.81%] 
France  6.40%  6.42%  3.26%  6.20%  11.11%  9.97% 
  [5.76-7.05%]  [5.90-6.93%]  [2.60-3.92%]  [5.41-6.99%]  [10.29-11.93%]  [9.11-10.84%] 
Germany  7.06%  6.40%  4.96%  10.48%  8.13%  14.06% 
  [6.44-7.68%]  [5.92-6.88%]  [4.04-5.88%]  [9.48-11.47%]  [7.42-8.84%]  [13.01-15.10%] 
Netherlands  2.39%  4.95%  4.40%  4.59%  10.23%  7.69% 
  [1.74-3.03%]  [4.23-5.67%]  [3.25-5.54%]  [3.70-5.47%]  [9.02-11.45%]  [6.34-9.04%] 
Anglo-Saxon             
Ireland  4.16%  3.49%  10.21%  11.04%  6.99%  14.00% 
  [3.40-4.93%]  [2.92-4.06%]  [8.28-12.14%]  [9.44-12.65%]  [5.74-8.23%]  [12.25-15.76%] 
United Kingdom  2.07%  5.77%  1.84%  13.97%  4.07%  16.85%  
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   [1.71-2.44%]  [5.27-6.27%]  [1.26-2.43%]  [12.73-15.20%]  [3.53-4.61%]  [15.75-17.95%] 
Notes: [] = 95%-confidence interval; a = data not available 
Focusing  on  the  unemployment  rate  in  the  respective  welfare  states,  it  is  clear  that  there  is 
considerable  cross-regime  variation.  Two  clusters  of  countries  emerge:  one  is  characterised  by 
relatively  high  unemployment  (Finland,  Belgium,  France  and  Germany),  the  other  by  low 
unemployment rates (Denmark, Norway, Austria, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). Ireland 
occupies an intermediate position. The observed percentages are slightly lower than those cited in 
the official ILO statistics for 2005 (ILO, 2005) due to the exclusion of respondents under the age of 
25.  The  cross-country  differences  in  respect  of  ill-health  are  less  outspoken,  ranging  from  3.49 
percent in Ireland to 7.77 percent in Norway. In the Scandinavian countries, ill-health rates are 
relatively high, whereas in the continental and Anglo-Saxon countries the rates vary. As regards 
jobless households, the observed variation is considerable. The proportion of individuals living in a 
jobless household is relatively high in Belgium and Ireland, and low in the United Kingdom. With 
regard  to  single  parenthood,  the  Anglo-Saxon  countries  report  relatively  high  levels,  as  does 
Germany, unlike some other continental European countries (such as Austria and the Netherlands). 
Temporary  employment  rates  are  high  in  Finland,  Norway,  France  and  the  Netherlands,  and 
somewhat lower in Austria and the United Kingdom. These results are largely consistent with figures 
from the OECD (2002). In relation to low pay, there is no clear divide between the Scandinavian, the 
continental  and  the  Anglo-Saxon  countries.  High  rates  are  found  in  Finland,  Norway,  Austria, 
Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom, whereas in Denmark, Belgium and France the proportion 
of  low-paid  employees  is  relatively  low.  This  pattern  is  consistent  with  reports  in  the  existing 
literature (Lucifora and Salverda, 2009; Salverda and Mayhew, 2009). However, the low estimate for 
the  Netherlands  is  surprising.  This  anomaly  is  most  probably  due  to  the  exclusion  of  part-time 
workers from our analysis. 
Statistical methods 
To  assess  the  impact  of  social  stratification  determinants,  we  make  use  of  a  pooled  country 
regression model (combining all country samples). We run individual (stepwise) logistic models for 
each social risk, starting from a simple model incorporating only social class of origin. In subsequent 
models, educational attainment and current social class are added. In all of these models, variables 
are included to control for age, sex and country effects. For unemployment, age² has also been 
added to the model. Finally, in order to test for cross-country variation in the impact of social class, 
interaction  terms  are  inserted  into  the  models.  With  a  view  to  achieving  interpretable  results, 
countries are grouped according to the Esping-Andersen welfare state typology (social democratic, 
liberal and conservative) (1990). In all analyses, we use only responses characterised by valid values 
for both social class (of origin and own social class), educational degree and the social risk concerned 
(listwise deletion). Standard errors are calculated assuming simple random sample design and taking 
into account the clustering of respondents within households.
7 
Results 
In this section, we present the outcomes of the (stepwise) logistic regression models. The results are 
set out as odds ratios and all the reported coefficients are net of country effects for which controls 
have been introduced.
8 Tables 3 and 4 display the regression results for our selection of social risks:  
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unemployment, ill-health, jobless household, single parenthood, temporary employment, and low 
pay. For all social risks, three main effect models are presented: Model 1 incorporating only social 
class of the father, Model 2 which also takes account of the respondent’s educational level, and 
Model 3 which adds ‘achieved’ social class. In order to correctly interpret the stepwise regressions, 
we also rely on an ordinal logistic regression model for assessing the impact of social class of origin 
on respondents’ educational level.
9 Social class of origin is found to influence educational attainment 
in the anticipated manner, i.e. lower social background is associated with higher low-skill rates.  
Table 3 presents the results of the stepwise logistic regression for unemployment, ill-health and living 
in a jobless household. With regard to social class of origin, respondents whose father had a high-
skilled non-manual occupation, a low-skilled non-manual occupation or a skilled manual occupation 
have a lower chance of being unemployed, having ill-health or living in a jobless household. These 
results seem to confirm our first hypothesis. However, the effect of intergenerational background is 
stronger for ill-health and jobless household than for unemployment. For all social risks considered in 
Table  3,  the  addition  of  the  respondents’  educational  level  and  current  social  class  significantly 
improves the regression model. In line with our second hypothesis, the impact of social class of origin 
is  mediated  by  educational  attainment  and  own  occupation.  However,  the  effect  of  social 
background on ill-health does not disappear after the introduction of educational level and own 
social class.  
Table 3     Results stepwise logistic regression for unemployment, ill-health and jobless household 
   Unemployment  Ill-health  Jobless household 
   Model1  Model2  Model3  Model1  Model2   Model3   Model1  Model2  Model3 







***  1.009  1.004  1.006 
Age² (centred)  1.002
***  1.002
***  1.002
***  a   a  a   a    a  a  









Social class father                   
High-skilled non-manual  0.682




***  0.829  0.958 
Low-skilled non-manual  0.722




*  0.924  1.019 
Skilled manual  0.787
**  0.831




**  0.845  0.877 
Elementary occupations  Ref  Ref  Ref  Ref  Ref  Ref  Ref  Ref  Ref 
Not in work  1.309
*  1.349
*  1.404





Educational level                   
High-skilled    0.415
***  0.648
***    0.441
***  0.599
***    0.181
***  0.277
*** 
Medium-skilled    0.709
***  0.824
*    0.641
***  0.713
***    0.369
***  0.430
*** 
Low-skilled    Ref  Ref    Ref  Ref    Ref  Ref 
Own social class                    
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High-skilled non-manual      0.303
***      0.474
***      0.330
*** 
Low-skilled non-manual      0.514
***      0.653
***      0.543
*** 
Skilled manual      0.618
***      0.830
*      0.761 
Elementary occupations      Ref      Ref      Ref 
Model characteristics                   
Mc Fadden's pseudo R²  0.051  0.061
***  0.073
***  0.051  0.060
***  0.066
***  0.086  0.121
***  0.132
*** 
n  42802  42802  42802  55732  55732  55732  20378  20378  20378 
Notes: controlled for country effects (country dummies); Ref = category of reference; 
* p<0,05, 
** p<0,01, 
*** p<0,001; a = 
not included in the regression model; n = number of cases 
Table 4 provides an overview of the results for single parenthood, temporary employment and low 
pay. The regression results (Model 1) for single parenthood and low pay confirm our first hypothesis, 
as social class of origin influences the lone parenthood and low pay risk in the anticipated manner. In 
contrast, no significant intergenerational effects are found for temporary employment. Furthermore, 
the  impact  of  educational  attainment  on  temporary  employment  is  somewhat  different  than 
anticipated. Education influences the likelihood of temporary employment in a non-linear manner, as 
the contrast between the high skilled and the low skilled (OR=0.672, p<0.001) is smaller than that 
between the medium skilled and the low skilled (OR=0.638, p<0.001). Subsequently, we find only 
partial  confirmation  for  our  second  hypothesis,  as  the  impact  of  social  class  of  origin  on  single 
parenthood is mediated only by educational level, not by own social class (Model 3 does not improve 
the model fit). Finally, for low pay, social class effects are mediated by as well educational degree 
and own social class. 
Table 4     Results stepwise logistic regression for single parenthood, temporary employment and low pay 
   Single parenthood  Temporary employment  Low pay 
   Model1  Model2  Model3  Model1  Model2   Model3   Model1  Model2  Model3 





















Social class father                   
High-skilled non-manual  0.751
**  0.867  0.884  0.977  1.024  1.110  0.643
***  0.922  1.140 
Low-skilled non-manual  0.902  0.991  1.004  0.882  0.920  0.990  0.643
***  0.781
**  0.905 
Skilled manual  0.762
**  0.808
*  0.817
*  0.848  0.875  0.922  1.015  1.119  1.174
* 
Elementary occupations  Ref  Ref  Ref  Ref  Ref  Ref  Ref  Ref  Ref 
Not in work  1.257  1.263  1.255  1.217  1.230  1.28  1.096  1.175  1.239 
Educational level                    
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High-skilled    0.547
***  0.586
***    0.672
***  0.826
*    0.233
***  0.434
*** 
Medium-skilled    0.657
***  0.678
***    0.638
***  0.716
***    0.538
***  0.652
*** 
Low-skilled    Ref  Ref    Ref  Ref    Ref  Ref 
Own social class                   
High-skilled non-manual      0.769
*      0.450
***      0.205
*** 
Low-skilled non-manual      0.835      0.490
***      0.442
*** 
Skilled manual      0.763
*      0.486
***      0.622
*** 
Elementary occupations      Ref      Ref      Ref 
Model characteristics                   
Mc Fadden's pseudo R²  0.123  0.128
***  0.128  0.047  0.049
***  0.054
***  0.043  0.075
***  0.102
*** 
n  20690  20690  20690  32586  32586  32586  29044  29044  29044 
Notes: controlled for country effects (country dummies); Ref = category of reference; 
* p<0,05, 
** p<0,01, 
*** p<0,001; n = 
number of cases 
In  conclusion,  for  all  of  the  social  risks  considered,  except  for  temporary  employment,  clear 
intergenerational background effects are found. In line with the second hypothesis, these effects are 
almost totally mediated by educational attainment and own social class. Thus far, we have only 
controlled for the difference in risk levels between welfare states. Hence it remains worthwhile to 
investigate  whether  and  to  what  extent  the  effects  of  social  stratification  determinants  differ 
between welfare state regimes. In order to obtain interpretable results, we group the countries 
according to Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typology (social democratic, liberal and conservative). 
Table 5 presents an overview of the significant effects that are found in the interaction models.
10 For 
each social risk, three interaction models are investigated: one containing only interactions between 
social class of origin and welfare regime, a second that adds interactions between educational degree 
and welfare set up, and a third model that also includes interactions with current social class.  For 
each  stratification  variable  (social  class  of  father,  educational  level,  and  own  social  class),  it 
documents whether the addition of interaction terms significantly improves the regression model. 
The odds ratios are given only if both the model and the interaction term are statistically significant. 
To facilitate interpretation, it should be borne in mind that the reference group or benchmark is low 
skilled with an elementary occupation in a social democratic welfare state, whose father held an 
elementary occupation. 













Social class father  ns  ns  ns  ***  ***  *** 
High-skilled non-manual * conservative            0.409
*** 




Looking first of all at the results for unemployment, it is clear that there are no significant interaction 
terms with social class of origin. In line with our third hypothesis, the social background effects are 
the same across welfare state regimes. Focusing on the interaction terms for educational degree and 
own social class, significant effects are found in the conservative welfare states. The results may be 
interpreted as providing an indication that the unemployment risk is less socially stratified in the 
conservative (continental) welfare states than in the social democratic (Scandinavian) welfare states. 
Finally, a significant result is found for the liberal welfare states, where the effect of skilled manual 
occupations is smaller. Subsequently, the addition of interaction terms does not improve the model 
for the social risk of ill-health. We may therefore conclude that the basic stratification pattern does 
not significantly differ between the social democratic, the conservative and the liberal welfare states. 
As  regards  living  in  a  jobless  household,  only  one  significant  interaction  term  is  found  with 
educational level. The effect for medium skilled is stronger in the liberal welfare states, i.e. this risk is 
more stratified by education. In sum, insofar as the risks of unemployment, ill-health and living in a 
jobless household are concerned, the data seem to confirm our third hypothesis. 
Skilled manual * conservative            0.453
*** 
Not in work * conservative            0.424
** 
High-skilled non-manual * liberal        0.276
***    0.358
*** 
Low-skilled non-manual * liberal          0.470
*  0.505
** 
Skilled manual * liberal            0.389
*** 
Not in work * liberal            0.437
* 
Educational level  ***  ns  ***  ***  ***  *** 
High-skilled * conservative  1.716
**        0.539
***   
Medium-skilled * conservative  1.484
*           
High-skilled * liberal          0.485
***  0.477
*** 





Own social class  ***  ns  ns  ***  ns  *** 
High-skilled non-manual * conservative  2.134
***      2.106
**    0.355
*** 
Low-skilled non-manual * conservative  1.878
**           
Skilled manual * conservative  1.880
**          0.340
*** 
High-skilled non-manual * liberal            0.203
*** 
Low-skilled non-manual * liberal             
Skilled manual * liberal  2.001
*              0.241
*** 
Notes: controlled for age (also age² for unemployment), sex, social class of the father, educational level, own social class 
and country effects (grouped according to the Esping-Andersen welfare typology); ns = non-significant; 
* p<0,05, 
** p<0,01, 
*** p<0,001; only the significant interaction terms are given  
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Subsequently, three significant effects are found for lone parenthood. However, the vast majority of 
interaction  terms  are  not  significant,  providing  no  indication  that  stratification  patterns  differ 
between welfare state regimes. As regards temporary employment, the most distinct finding is the 
different impact of education in the selected welfare states. To some extent in the conservative 
welfare  states,  but  primarily  in  the  liberal ones,  educational  attainment seems to  have  a  larger 
impact. Finally, Table 5 displays the results for the risk of holding low-paid employment. For this 
social risk, there is clear evidence of a divergent impact of social stratification determinants. Here 
some indications are found for our fourth hypothesis, which states that patterns between welfare 
state regimes differ. First and foremost, social background (in terms of father’s social class) plays a 
more determining role in the conservative and liberal welfare states. In addition, interaction effects 
are also found for educational degree. The occurrence of low pay in the liberal welfare states is 
influenced more by educational qualification. Finally, the individual’s current social class has a more 
substantial impact in the liberal and conservative welfare states. 
The abovementioned analyses confirm the persistent influence of social background, conceived as 
social  class  of  origin.  Intergenerational  effects  are  found  for  all  social  risks  except  temporary 
employment. Hence, the findings tend to confirm our first hypothesis. The strongest class effects are 
observed for the likelihood of ill-health and living in a jobless household. In line with the second 
hypothesis, the findings show that these effects are mediated by educational degree and own social 
class. As for potential differences between welfare state regimes, the main conclusion is that social 
stratification patterns are by and large the same across Europe (cf. hypothesis 3).
10 There is however 
one important exception, as our data indicates that there are clear differences in the stratification 
pattern for low pay. In the conservative and the liberal welfare states, the likelihood of low-paid 
employment is determined to a larger degree by social stratification determinants (social class of 
origin,  educational  degree  and  current  social  class).  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  these 
interaction terms do not alter the basic pattern of social stratification, namely that of persistent 
social background effects mediated by own education and social class. 
Conclusion 
Welfare states are facing challenging times. In consequence of changing economic, demographic and 
political conditions - Paul Pierson (1998) speaks of a context of ‘permanent austerity’ - social policy 
discourse  has changed.  Since  the 1990s, there  has  been  a  marked  shift  from  ‘traditional’  social 
protection towards ‘social investment’ (e.g. Morel et al., 2009; Perkins et al., 2004; Taylor-Gooby, 
2008). One of the main aims of the ‘new’ welfare state was to realign the welfare state around 
work.
11 As a result of the sharper focus on higher labour market participation, work requirements in 
protection schemes have been tightened (e.g. Clasen et al., 2001). Some argue that these changes 
have  led  to  a  new  citizenship  regime  (Jenson,  2009;  Jenson  and  Saint-Martin,  2003),  as  more 
emphasis is put on the reciprocity of rights and duties (Cox, 1998). As governments strive to invest in 
human capital and equal opportunities, a corresponding obligation emerges for individuals to take 
responsibility for their own choices. In the light of these transitions, we argue that it is necessary to 
understand the extent to which social background (in terms of social class) influences the likelihood 
of being affected by social risks. Otherwise, a growing emphasis on individual responsibility could 
lead to new forms of marginalisation or erode the level of protection against some traditional forms 
of exclusion (Heron and Dwyer, 1999).  
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More or less concurrently, doubt has grown with regard to the structuring impact of social class. Due 
to societal transitions, such as changes in the labour market and in family structures, social risks are 
said  to  have  become  detached  from  their  traditional  class  moorings.  Some  claim  that  we  have 
evolved to a so-called ‘risk society’, where higher levels of social risks are more widely diffused 
among segments of the population (Beck, 1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1996; Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim,  2002).  With  regard  to  social  exclusion,  some  observe  an  ‘individualisation’  of  risks, 
implying that traditional social stratification determinants (such as social class) have lost their impact. 
Echoing Beck, Leisering and Leibfried (1999) speak of a ‘democratisation of poverty’, asserting that 
poverty risks have come to transcend traditional social boundaries.  
In  this  paper,  the  focus  has  been  on  the  following  selection  of  socio-economic  circumstances: 
unemployment, ill-health, living in a jobless household, lone parenthood, temporary employment, 
and low-paid employment. For most of these social risks, we find clear evidence of a continuing 
impact of social class of origin. Only in the case of temporary employment are no intergenerational 
effects observed. The strongest intergenerational background effects are found in relation to ill-
health and living in a jobless household. However, we have found that social background effects are 
largely  mediated  by  the  individual’s  own  educational  attainment  and  ‘achieved’  social  class. 
Remarkably,  the  addition  of  current  social  class  does  not  improve  the  model  fit  for  single 
parenthood, implying that (controlled for social class of origin and educational level) own occupation 
does not influence the likelihood of lone parenthood. From a comparative welfare state perspective, 
indications were found to support the view that, particularly with regard to social class of origin, 
stratification patterns are by and large the same across welfare state regimes (social democratic, 
conservative  and  liberal).  The  only  exception  relates  to  the  likelihood  of  holding  low-paid 
employment. Here, the impact of the social stratification influences on which we have focused is 
weaker in the social democratic welfare states. However, this does not significantly alter the basic 
social stratification pattern observed. In the Scandinavian countries, too, low-paid jobs are mainly 
held by employees from less advantaged social backgrounds. In sum, our analysis shows that social 
risks are far from individualised. Having said that, we are unable to draw conclusions about whether 
the impact of social class has decreased over time, as this would require high-quality longitudinal 
data.
12 
So  what  are  the  policy  consequences  of  the  ‘social  stratification  of  social  risks’?  Clearly  policy 
scholars  need  to  take  note  of  the  strong  and  resilient  intergenerational  class  effects.  Despite 
sustained  efforts  to  achieve  equality  of  opportunity,  social  class  still  has  a  significant  influence.
 
Overall, we are convinced that two lessons can be learnt from our results. First of all, they suggest 
that caution is called for in emphasising individual responsibility, as the reciprocity of rights and 
duties has come at the forefront of social investment discourse (Jenson, 2009; Jenson and Saint-
Martin,  2003).  As  governments  try  to  invest  in  human  capital  and  in  equality  of  opportunity, 
individuals are expected to take responsibility for their own actions. In line with this expectation, 
welfare states are now being (re)designed to provide the right ‘stimuli’ for people to participate in 
the labour market, e.g. by eliminating so-called ‘unemployment traps’. However, participation in the 
labour  market  remains  heavily  mediated  by  social  background.  Therefore,  a  one-sided  focus  on 
individual  responsibility  could  generate  new  forms  of  marginalisation,  as  the  rhetoric  of 
modernisation  may  open  the  door  to  restricting  the  rights  of  traditional  beneficiaries  of  social 
security. Secondly, there are indications to believe that ‘old’ social spending (providing coverage 
against traditional social risks) is more redistributive than ‘new’ social provisions, designed mainly to  
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stimulate  labour  market  participation  (e.g.  Cantillon,  2011;  Ghysels  and  Van  Lancker,  2010).  As 
exclusion from the labour market is most prevalent in the lower social classes, traditional social 
spending is targeted at beneficiaries from those population groups. As such, the growth of ‘new’ 
social spending, e.g. child care provision, might lead to ‘resource competition’ (Vandenbroucke and 
Vleminckx, 2011). In fact, in the context of stagnating social expenditures, the social investment 
perspective puts budgetary pressures on ‘traditional’ protection schemes. In sum, we are convinced 
that the ‘new’ welfare state needs to pursue a balanced strategy whereby the objectives of greater 
labour market participation and adequate social protection are effectively reconciled. 
Notes 
1  Paul Pierson (1998), in a discussion of ‘permanent austerity’, argues that the relative growth 
of the service sector, the maturation of social programmes and demographic transitions have led to 
increasing budgetary strains. In the light of these changes, welfare states are evolving, albeit at 
different paces, with a view to achieving higher labour market participation. 
2  Perkins,  Nelms  and  Smyth  (2004)  identify  two  other,  central  elements  in  the  ‘social 
investment’ discourse. First of all, the social investment state tends to integrate the economic and 
social dimensions of policy. There is a concern with legitimising social spending by emphasising its 
‘cost  effectiveness’.  Hence  investment  in  equality  of  opportunity  is  at  the  heart  of  the  social 
investment discourse. Correspondingly, less prominence is given to equality of outcomes. Jenson and 
Saint-Martin (2003: 92) observe that “high rates of inequality, low wages, poor jobs or temporary 
deprivation are not a serious problem in and of themselves; they are so only if individuals become 
trapped in those circumstances”.  
3  Social background is used here in a broad sense, comprising amongst others social class of 
origin (e.g. occupation of the father) and educational level of the parents. 
4  High-skilled  non-manual  occupations:  comprising  legislators,  senior  officials,  managers, 
professionals,  technicians  and  associate  professionals  (ISCO  11-34);  Low-skilled  non-manual 
occupations: comprising clerks, service workers, shop and market sales workers (ISCO 41-52); Skilled 
manual occupations: comprising skilled agricultural/fishery workers, craft and related trades workers, 
plant/machine  operators  and  assemblers  (ISCO  61-83);  Elementary  occupations:  comprising 
sales/services elementary occupations, agricultural/fishery and related labourers and labourers in 
mining/construction/manufacturing/transport  (ISCO  91-93);  Not  in  work:  no  corresponding  ISCO 
code  and  the  respondent’s  father  was  not  at  work  when  the  respondent  was  14  years  old 
(unemployed, retired, homemaker or ‘other inactive’). 
5  Our operationalisation is in line with the neo-Weberian approach towards social class, as it 
lays emphasis on the division between manual and non-manual occupations. Marxist approaches 
(e.g. Eric Olin Wright’s class scheme), on the contrary, accentuate the owner/non-owner distinction 
and the degree of control over labour (Duke and Edgell, 1987). 
6  There are only 861 valid cases for respondents aged 25 to 64 years. 
7  Arguably,  this  leads  to  an  underestimation  of  the  real  standard  errors,  as  samples  are 
(mostly) drawn using a stratified sampling design. More information on the sampling design and 
standard errors in the EU-SILC data can be found in a CSB Working Paper by Tim Goedemé (2010).   
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8  The  categories  of  reference  are  elementary  occupations  (social  class  father),  low-skilled 
(educational level) and elementary occupations (own social class). To control for country effect, 
country dummies have been added to the models, using Belgium as category of reference. 
9  Social background (social class of the father) has the anticipated effect, as lower social classes 
are associated with higher low-skill rates.
 The results of this (ordinal logistic) regression are available 
from the authors by request. 
10  It must be stressed that this does not imply there are no differences between countries with 
regard to social stratification patterns. However, this heterogeneity does not show up as significant 
in our regression models and / or is not consistent with the Esping-Andersen typology. 
11  Note that the extent to which welfare states have evolved towards social investment states 
remains a question for empirical research. 
12  Hence  we  cannot  determine  to  what  extent  social  investment  approaches,  such  as 
investment in early education, help to mitigate the effects of social class. 
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